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Lay Abstract 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are characterised by difficulties in 
understanding social situations and in particular social interactions where non-literal 
language (e.g. sarcasm) is used. Researchers have devised a number of measures to 
try and capture these subtle social differences in adults with ASD.  We sought to 
overcome the limitations of previous measures by designing a novel task (the Strange 
Stories Film task) using short video clips, which were based on a well-established test 
of social understanding (the Strange Stories task). After piloting, the new task was 
shown to a group of 20 adults with ASD and their responses were compared to a group 
of adults without any diagnosis. The study found that the new task was superior to 
previous measures, and could be useful in assessing social difficulties in a clinical 
setting. We also consider the limitations of our study and future research directions. 
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Scientific Abstract 
Introduction: Real-life social processing abilities of adults with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) can be hard to capture in lab-based experimental tasks. A novel 
measure of social cognition, the ‘Strange Stories Film task’ (SSFt), was designed to 
overcome limitations of available measures in the field.  
Method: Brief films were made based on the scenarios from the Strange Stories 
task (Happé 1994) and designed to capture the subtle social-cognitive difficulties 
observed in ASD adults. 20 neurotypical adults were recruited to pilot the new 
measure. A final test set was produced and administered to a group of 20 adults with 
ASD and 20 matched controls, alongside established social cognition tasks and 
questionnaire measures of empathy, alexithymia and ASD traits. 
Results: The SSFt was more effective than existing measures at differentiating the 
ASD group from the control group. In the ASD group the SSFt was associated with the 
Strange Stories task.  
Conclusion: The SSFt is a potentially useful tool to identify social cognitive 
dis/abilities in ASD, with preliminary evidence of adequate convergent validity. Future 
research directions are discussed.
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Introduction 
 Over the last thirty years the social cognitive abilities of individuals with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) have been widely 
studied, with a range of theories proposed to conceptualise observed differences in 
social understanding. The ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) account suggests that ASD is 
characterised by a fundamental difficulty in the ability to represent the mental states of 
others. ToM was initially assessed through ‘false belief’ tasks requiring first- (“what 
does Sally [mistakenly] think”) and, later, second- order mental state attribution (“what 
does John [mistakenly] think that Mary thinks”) (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happé, 1995). However, ceiling effects are often observed on 
such tasks (which typically developing 5- to 7-year-olds pass), particularly in samples 
of ASD adults without intellectual impairment (Bowler, 1992; White, Hill, Happé, & 
Frith, 2009).  
To overcome the lack of sensitivity of simple false belief tasks, a number of tests 
of more advanced ‘mentalising’ have been developed. For example, Happé’s ‘Strange 
Stories’ (SS; Happé, 1994) presented 24 short written vignettes (two each of 12 
themes, e.g. irony, double-bluff, white lie, persuasion) requiring participants to explain 
the speaker’s intention in cases where utterances were not literally true. A recent meta-
analysis suggests that the SS are useful in differentiating ToM abilities in adults with 
ASD from matched controls (Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2013). However, the written 
format of the SS task means it does not tap the ability to process naturalistic social 
cues, such as facial expression and vocal intonation. Furthermore, participants are 
given as much time as necessary to process the material, in marked contrast to the 
fast-paced nature of real-life social interaction, which may explain why individuals may 
‘pass’ the SS yet still struggle in everyday situations (Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, & 
Begeer, 2013).  
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The problem of assessing subtle ToM difficulties in an ecologically valid manner 
has led to a conceptual divide between prioritising limited, but real interactions as 
stimuli (Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001) or diverse and theoretically tailored 
stimuli produced through acted interactions (Dziobek et al., 2006; Mathersul, 
McDonald, & Rushby, 2013) The former has been advocated by Roeyers and 
colleagues utilising the empathic accuracy paradigm (for more information see; Ickes, 
Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990), and has been shown to be an effective means 
of capturing differences in social cognitive abilities between individuals with autism and 
matched controls (for both adults and adolescents; Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & 
Clercq, 2008; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers 
et al., 2001; Roeyers & Demurie, 2010).  Whilst naturalistic in design, the nature of the 
stimuli (e.g. a brief conversation with a stranger) means particular linguistic constructs 
that people with ASD may struggle with (e.g. deception; Happe, 1994) are less likely 
to occur. This is especially important as incongruence between mental events and 
behavioural cues available to the viewer predicts poor performance on this task 
(Ponnet et al., 2008). The generic nature of the situation may also lead to a narrowing 
of the potential internal states experienced/to be inferred. A number of studies have 
attempted to capture social cognitive abilities using scripted social exchanges, which 
overcome some of these limitations, and these are outlined in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Table 1 shows that difficulties with social cognition are consistently found in 
individuals with ASD when acted stimuli are employed. Convergent validity (with other 
social cognition tasks) was demonstrated in most cases, but not all. A consistent 
limitation was the lack of challenging control stimuli. Where control questions were 
used (usually memory based questions) performance often reached ceiling (Dziobek 
et al., 2006) or, in some cases, yielded group differences (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-
Cohen, & Rutter, 2000). The majority of the studies also used pre-existing film material, 
which may have been over-dramatized or chosen because of high affective content 
(Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006). Using overdramatized material undermines 
ecological validity, which has been heralded as essential in understanding social 
cognition in ASD (Dziobek, 2012). Finally, one of the most psychometrically and 
theoretically robust measures to date was filmed in Germany (Dziobek et al., 2006). 
To the authors’ knowledge, the English dubbed version has not been validated in an 
English speaking country with an ASD sample. Moreover, a recent Spanish dubbed 
version yielded differing results to the original validation paper, with the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) 
outperforming the dubbed measure. Dubbing material may differentially affect 
performance for individuals with ASD given research suggesting preferential gaze to 
the mouth region in ASD during viewing of social exchanges and possible greater 
sensitivity to visual-auditory asynchrony (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; Klin, 
Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). 
Past measures of social cognition tended to focus exclusively on comprehension 
of a social situation (Mathersul et al., 2013). Recent research has begun to ask 
participants to generate possible social responses to typical interactions (e.g. ‘What 
would you do in this situation?’; Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts, & Channon, 2014) and 
found that autistic traits are associated with fewer pro-social responses. Mutual goals 
that require cooperation have been argued as fundamental in the development of 
social cognition and young people with autism’s ability to help and cooperate with 
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others is likely to affect their social cognitive developmental trajectory (Liebal, Colombi, 
Rogers, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). The concept of pro-social behaviour is linked 
to ‘social acting’ (Yang & Baillargeon, 2013), where beliefs are decoupled from speech 
for the benefit of another (e.g. white lies). Yang and Baillargeon (2013) found it was 
‘social acting’ and not social comprehension that predicted quality of social 
relationships in typically developing adults (rated high or low for autistic traits). These 
findings highlight a gap in the social cognition literature, which is particularly pertinent 
to the current study. How social knowledge is applied is important, given some findings 
that adults with ASD can make accurate mental state inferences (Ponnet, Buysse, 
Roeyers, & Corte, 2005) even though abilities to maintain meaningful relationships 
may be limited (Palmen, Didden, & Lang, 2012). 
Overall, a range of measures are currently available to assess social cognition in 
ASD. Limitations include a lack of appropriate control material, non-naturalistic stimuli, 
a trade-off between length of test and richness of open-ended response data and a 
focus on receptive versus expressive skills, all of which suggest new social cognition 
tasks are still required.   
The current study introduces a new measure of theory of mind that attempts to 
address a number of the limitations outlined above and assess mental state attribution 
in a more naturalistic way in adults with ASD. To assess validity, the new task was 
administered to ASD and typically developing (TD) adults alongside established and 
widely used social cognitive tests and questionnaires about ASD-relevant traits. Social 
cognition clearly encompasses a range of processes, including but not limited to 
mental state attribution (ToM) and emotion processing, which appear to be distinct, but 
interdependent (Brewer, Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2015). We therefore included standard 
tests of both processes alongside our novel task, as well as measuring self-reported 
empathy and alexithymia (difficulty reflecting on and describing one’s emotions); work 
by Bird and colleagues (Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013) 
suggests that it is the degree of frequently co-occurring alexithymia rather than  ASD 
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itself that predicts poor affective empathy and emotion processing in those with ASD 
(and other clinical groups). The aim of the current study was to test the sensitivity of 
our new measure to capture ASD mentalising abilities and examine its relationship to 
existing measures and social abilities in every day life.  
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Method 
The Strange Stories Film Task 
Scripts and filming: Scripts for the Strange Stories Film Task Pilot (SSFt-P) were 
developed using clinical experience, research literature and personal communication 
from an associate of the first author who has a ASD diagnosis. The SSFt-P was based 
on the original Strange Stories (Happé, 1994), which used the following types of 
scenarios to test the ability to attribute a speaker’s intention : lie, irony, double bluff, 
pretence, joke, appearance/reality, white-lie, persuasion, misunderstanding, 
forgetting, contrary emotions and idioms. For an example script and screen shots of 
the measure, see Appendix 1. The language used in the scripts was kept as close to 
everyday spoken language as possible, and complex constructions or overly 
sophisticated vocabulary were avoided. Three or four scripts for each theme present 
in Happé (1994) SS were written to enable sub-optimal clips to be deleted from the 
final version. In addition, ten control scripts were written. These mirrored the 
experimental clips in terms of length, cognitive load and linguistic sophistication. 
However, they required logical reasoning (e.g. economic decision making or 
understanding of natural phenomena) to decipher the characters’ utterances or 
behaviour, rather than requiring attribution of mental states, akin to the control 
vignettes used by Fletcher et al. (1995) and White et al. (2009).  
The actors were semi-professional and were recruited via online advertisement 
and audition. In each scene, a third person perspective shot first showed the viewer 
the context of the social exchange. The scenes of this initial shot were kept as sparse 
as possible (e.g. artwork was taken from the walls) to minimise possible distractions 
that might differentially distract individuals with ASD (Klin et al., 2003), but were still 
kept naturalistic and did not burden participants’ imaginations (scenes were easy to 
identify as e.g., sitting room or kitchen). All speech was directed to camera and filmed 
in the first person (as if the viewer were in the conversation), both to reduce possible 
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attention biases for the viewers with ASD (Klin et al., 2003) and to provide the same 
sort of information available in a real-life conversation (e.g. full-face emotional 
expressions).  
 
Questions 
Three questions were used to assess social understanding immediately following 
the viewing of each clip: 1) Intention, 2) Interaction, and 3) Memory Question. The 
Intention question ‘Why did X say that?’ was taken from Happé (1994) SS, and always 
referred to the last speaker and final utterance of the film clip. The Interaction question 
asked about a possible response to the final utterance of the clip; ‘If you were in Y’s 
[other character i.e. not X] situation, what would you say next?’  This question was 
designed to assess participants’ ability to generate a response to the inferred mental 
state (e.g., intention) of the speaker, in order to continue the social exchange. The 
Memory question was used to assess potential lapses in attention or gross difficulties 
in memory, and always took the form of a closed question about a factual aspect of 
the clip, e.g. ‘What instrument was X playing?’ 
 
Scoring 
The scoring system for the SSFt was kept as simple as possible and was based 
on White et al. (2009) p.1109-1117 and Happé (1994). For the Intention question, the 
score given reflected how accurately the participant recognised the relevant mental 
states, and captured the difference between simple and more complex mental state 
inferences (e.g. second-order versus first-order mental state attribution), simplistic or 
incomplete responses, which have previously differentiated ASD from non ASD 
populations (Happé, 1995). Mental state language was also scored to identify whether 
participants used mental state words (e.g. he wants or she thinks) to describe the 
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actors’ intentions. For the Interaction question, scoring reflected the appropriateness 
of the participant’s suggested response to the speaker. For the Memory question, all 
scores were based on correctly identifying the factual information in the relevant clip.  
As an example, the scoring system for the white lie scene (see Appendix 1 for 
screen shots of ‘white lie’ clip), which was based on White et al. (2009) p.1110   is 
outlined below: 
 
White Lie:  
Intention Question: Why did Max say that? 
Accuracy:  
2 points - reference to white lie or making her feel good or not wanting to hurt 
Alice’s feelings  
 
1 point - response that states simple traits (e.g., he is nice, being supportive, polite) 
or is simply relational (e.g., he likes her). Incomplete response (e.g., offering fake 
praise) or solely motivational (e.g., so she won’t be annoyed, avoid an argument, 
reassure her).   
 
0 points – incorrect e.g. ‘he thought it was good’ or only ‘he didn’t like it’, or 
irrelevant responses.   
 
Mental State Language 
0 points - no mental state words.   
 
1point – simple mental state words regarding one character or another character’s 
actions OR words that imply psychological states in social context. 
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
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2 points – meta-cognitive statements e.g. beliefs about beliefs OR intentions to 
affect another person’s mental state e.g. he didn’t want to hurt her feelings OR complex 
collection of mental states. 
 
Interaction Question: ‘If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?’ 
2 points – statement that acknowledges that Max’s comment might not have been 
completely honest and either asks for additional clarification or additional feedback in 
socially appropriate manner (e.g., ‘do you really mean that?’); sarcastic agreement 
with his opinion that implies it could be improved.  
 
1 point –Incomplete response e.g. ‘thank you’, that doesn’t reflect white lie. 
 
0 points – don’t know, socially inappropriate (e.g. response that sees comment as 
unsupportive or misses intention of white lie), or irrelevant comments. 
 
Memory Question: “What instrument was Alice playing?” 
1 point – mentions guitar. 
 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall. 
 
 Similar scoring systems are described in White et al. (2009), Devine and Hughes 
(2013) and Castelli, Frith, Happé, and Frith (2002). Of particular importance, this type 
of system has been shown to be reliable in other film-based tasks (Devine & Hughes, 
2013). In accordance with these systems, possible scores ranged from 0-2 for the 
Intention, Mental State Language and Interaction questions and 0-1 for the memory 
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question for each clip; maximum total scores were therefore 24, 24 and 12 
respectively. Full scoring guidelines are available from the last author. 
 
Piloting 
20 neurotypical adults (10 male, 10 female) were recruited via an opportunity 
sample. The mean age of the sample was 28.8years (SD = 7.66). Participants were 
only recruited into the study if they had an Autism Quotient (AQ) score below 32 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) No participants who opted into the study had to be rejected 
from the pilot due to the presence of high ASD traits as measured by the AQ (M= 10.80 
SD = 3.81 range = 6-17). Ethical approval was granted by the King’s College London 
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Ethics Sub-Committee (PNM/10/11-22). The SSFt-
p set consisted of 48 clips. Thirty-eight clips followed the themes of the 12 types of 
mental state vignettes presented in (Happe, 1994) Strange Stories. Ten control clips 
were based on physical state reasoning stories (White et al., 2009).  
 
Scenes were then selected based on who delivered the target utterance (male or 
female actor), and setting (kitchen, living room, outside, in an office) with the aim of 
having a balanced set of scenes. Ineffective clips were also removed if: fewer than a 
quarter of viewers identified the whole intended meaning in response to the Intention 
question (6 experimental and 2 control scenes); or a new character was introduced 
(n=1). 
 
The final set consisted of 12 experimental (one of each theme) and 3 control clips, 
where the female actor delivered the target utterance on nine occasions and the male 
on six. A second set of 12 viable clips remained for future research purposes. 
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Experimental study 
Participants 
A total of 40 participants were recruited into the experiment. Individuals in the ASD 
group (N=20) had all been assessed by a specialist adult ASD diagnostic service. The 
control group was recruited through an opportunity sample and advertisements in the 
local community detailing the research. To be included in the study, participants in the 
ASD group had to have a formal diagnosis of either Asperger Syndrome (N=16) or 
Autistic Disorder (N=4) decided by a multi-disciplinary team according to ICD-10 
criteria, be aged between 18 and 65 years at the time of testing, be fluent in English, 
have a verbal IQ> 70, have no other neurodevelopmental or organic disorder present 
(e.g. head injury) and none of the following psychiatric diagnoses: schizophrenia, 
eating disorders, personality disorder or substance abuse/dependence. Inclusion 
criteria for the control group were (in addition to the criteria above excluding the ASD 
diagnosis and ASD structured interviews); an AQ score below 32. Demographics of 
the groups can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The two groups were matched for age, gender and verbal ability (the control 
group’s scores ranged from 81-138 and the ASD group’s scores ranged from 73-134).  
The AQ acted as a screening measure for ASD traits (primarily for exclusion of 
participants from the Control group), and showed a significant difference between the 
groups (the control group’s scores ranged from 5-30, while the ASD group’s scores 
ranged from 18-48). In all but one case, a suitable informant was available to provide 
developmental history information for the participant’s ASD diagnosis via an ADI-R 
(Lord, Rutter, & Couteur, 1994). For the individual who did not have ADI-R data, 
diagnosis was supported by an ADOS (Lord et al., 1989). One participant in the ASD 
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
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group was unable to complete the AQ due to testing constraints. Ethical Approval for 
the study was granted by the National Research Ethics Service Committee – London, 
Westminster (13/LO/0092).  
 
Measures  
Wechsler Intelligence Scales: Verbal ability was measured using The Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), which is a brief, reliable and valid measure 
of general intelligence that is recommended for research purposes (Wechsler, 1999). 
In cases where a neuropsychological assessment had been completed within the NHS 
clinic they were recruited from, participants’ verbal ability was estimated from the short 
form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–III (WAIS-III; Axelrod, Ryan, & Ward, 
2001).  The WASI and the WAIS-III scores show good convergent validity (Wechsler, 
1999). In two cases, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–IV (WAIS-IV) was used 
(Wechsler, 2008).  
 
The Twenty item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20): The TAS-20 is a self-report 
instrument developed to identify alexithymia traits in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). In adults with ASD the TAS-20 shows 
good test-retest reliability, convergent validity and discriminate validity (Berthoz & Hill, 
2005) 
 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): The IRI is a 28 item self-report 
questionnaire designed to test empathy as a multi-dimensional construct (Davis, 1980; 
Davis, 1983). The IRI has been shown to effectively discriminate ASD individuals from 
a matched typically developing adult sample (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & 
Convit, 2007) 
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The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET): The RMET is a widely-used forced 
choice measure designed to tap mentalising abilities (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
Participants view 36 photographs of the eye region of a face and in each case choose 
from four words the one that best describes the emotion/internal state depicted.  The 
RMET is deemed one of the most effective socio-cognitive tasks available (Pinkham 
et al., 2013).  
 
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT): Participants completed the 
forced choice ‘Emotion Recognition’ subsection (Part 1) of the TASIT (McDonald, 
Flanagan, & Rollins, 2002). Participants view 28 short film clips, where an actor 
performed one of the 6 universal emotions: Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Anxiety, 
Surprise, Disgust, or was emotionally ‘Neutral.’   
 
The Frith-Happé Animations (Triangles): The Triangles is a silent dynamic ToM 
task (Castelli et al., 2002). Participants viewed a practice animation followed by four 
theory of mind animations on a computer screen. The Triangles task has been shown 
to reliably differentiate between high-functioning ASD groups and verbal ability 
matched control groups.  
 
The Strange Stories (SS): Participants completed a short form of the SS task 
(Fletcher et al., 1995; Happé, 1994) consisting of 8 short vignettes (two versions of the 
following themes: White lie, persuasion, double bluff and misunderstanding). The SS 
task has been shown to reliably differentiate adult ASD participants from control groups 
(Chung et al., 2013). 
 
The Strange Stories Film Task (SSFt): Prior to the task, participants were informed 
about the nature of the task and the characters’ relationship. Participants viewed 3 
practice clips, two of which were experimental clips and one was a control clip, but did 
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not receive feedback on performance. Participants then viewed 15 clips; 12 mental 
state clips and three control clips, presented in a quasi-randomised order (A). Half the 
participants viewed order A and the other half viewed the same clips but in reversed 
order (B). Clips lasted no longer than 27 seconds each (M= 17.5, SD= 5.83) and the 
total running time was six minutes and 21 seconds. Participants were asked the three 
questions described above following each clip (including the three practice clips). 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.58 for the Intention, 0.42 for the mental state language (e.g. use 
of words like want, feel etc.) question and 0.73 for the Interaction question, suggest 
adequate and satisfactory levels of internal consistency for the Intention and 
Interaction question respectively. The control questions (Intention and Interaction) 
showed alpha values lower than 0.4, which might be expected since they were not 
designed to tap a unitary underlying construct. Intra class coefficients (ICC) were 
above .80 on all elements of the SSFt suggesting high levels of inter-rater reliability.   
 
Procedure 
Testing took place for all participants in a quiet room, with breaks given as needed. 
Participants completed the AQ, TAS-20, IRI, SS, RMET, Triangles, TASIT and the 
SSFt. In some cases participants chose to complete some questionnaires/tasks 
outside the main session.  
 
Statistical analysis 
In all cases where VIQ correlated with performance on behavioural measures of 
social cognition, ANCOVA was completed with VIQ as a covariate; otherwise t-tests 
were performed to compare mean differences. Sensitivity analysis was performed 
using an independent bootstrap analysis to test whether the results were robust 
against deviations from normal distribution (Chung et al., 2013). Alpha values were set 
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at <.05 and effect sizes calculated using Cohen’s d (Chong & Choo, 2011). Partial 
Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated for the ANCOVA analyses (Cohen, 1992). 
Depending on the variables’ distribution/correlation with VIQ, correlations/partial 
correlations were calculated using either Spearman’s or Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. For the correlation analysis alpha value was reduced to <.01 to account for 
multiple comparisons. A Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve was performed 
to demonstrate the traditional social cognition measures and the new SSFt’s ability to 
assign participants to their correct diagnostic group.  
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
22 
Results 
Group differences on the standard social cognition tasks and questionnaires will 
be reported, before presenting the results from our novel film task, and its relationship 
to existing measures. 
 
Table 3 shows the groups differences on the standard social cognition measures. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The analyses revealed a significant group difference between the adults with ASD 
and the controls on the SS accuracy score, but not on the degree of mental state 
language used to explain behaviour (see Table 3). Accuracy and mental state 
language scores on the Triangles were significantly lower for the ASD group than for 
controls. There was a borderline significant group difference on the RMET but no 
significant difference on the emotion recognition subtest of the TASIT. 
 
Table 4 shows the two groups’ responses to the TAS-20 and IRI questionnaires. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
For the cognitive empathy subscales of the IRI, significant differences were seen 
between the two groups on the perspective taking subscale (see Table 4). Both the 
control group and individuals with ASD reported equal levels of empathic concern and 
fantasising. However, for the personal distress scale individuals with autism rated 
themselves as significantly higher (see Table 4). 
The TAS-20 revealed significantly higher levels of alexithymia in the ASD than the 
TD group, across each of the subscales and the total scale. In addition, significantly 
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more of the ASD group (52.6%) reported levels of alexithymia that passed the 
suggested cut-off (total score > 60 ; Bagby et al., 1994) compared to the control group 
(20%; X2 (1,39) = 4.51, p = .034).  
 
Table 5 shows the groups’ performance on the SSFt. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Participants with ASD scored significantly lower than controls on the Intention 
Accuracy and Interaction questions of the SSFt experimental clips, but their Mental 
State Language scores were statistically equivalent. Both groups performed equally 
well on the Intention (Accuracy and Mental State Language) and Interaction questions 
on the control clips (see Table 5).  No significant group differences were seen on the 
memory question for experimental or control clips, however, for the control memory 
questions this was not supported by the bootstrap analysis.  
 
Analysis revealed a trend towards a significant association between the Intention 
and Interaction scores of the SSFt in the ASD group once verbal abilities had been 
controlled for (r = .56, p = .012). For the controls however this association was 
statistically significant (r = .62, p = .004). Fischer r-to-z transformation revealed that 
these two coefficients were not statistically different however (z = -.27, p =.79).  
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The ROC curve in Figure 1 demonstrates each social cognition measure’s ability 
to accurately assign the participants to their respective group. Only measures in which 
there was a significant mean difference between the two groups were included. Mental 
state language scores did not differentiate correct from incorrect responses so were 
not included. The AUC values and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the 
scales were .87 (.76 - .98) for the SSFt Interaction scores, .78 (.63 - .93) for the SSFt 
Intention accuracy scores, .72 (.56 – .88) for the SS Accuracy score, .71 (.55 - .88) for 
the RMET and .69 (.53 - .86) for the Triangles accuracy score. Of note, all of the 
confidence intervals overlapped. The RMET was not included in the figure as it had a 
missing data point. 
 
The SSFt convergent validity  
Partial correlations (controlling for verbal ability) were performed and revealed the 
following in the ASD group. First, the correlation between the Intention Accuracy score 
on the SSFt and the Accuracy score on the SS was significant, (r = .61, p = .006). The 
Mental State Language scores however, did not correlate significantly between the SS 
and the SSFt within this group (rs <.40).  The Intention scores (Accuracy and Mental 
State Language) did not correlate with the corresponding scores from the Triangles 
task (r < .40). Finally, the SSFt accuracy score did not significantly correlate with the 
RMET (r < .40). 
 
For the control group, the Intention scores (Accuracy and Mental State Language) 
did not correlate with the SS’s Accuracy (rs < .40) and Mental State Language (r < .40) 
scores, respectively. Similarly, no association was revealed between the Accuracy 
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score on the SSFt and the RMET (rs < .40). The relationships between the SSFt 
Intention scores (Accuracy and Mental State Language) and the corresponding scores 
on the Triangles task were substantial, although they missed the significance level of 
.01 set here (r s= .40, p = .084 and  r = .54, p = .015, respectively). 
 
SSFt association with childhood ASD symptoms and self-reported ASD traits, empathy 
and alexithymia.  
Within the ASD group, partial correlations revealed no significant associations 
between the SSFt Intention Accuracy or Interaction scores and the ADI-R Reciprocal 
Social Interaction (rs < .40) and Communication (r < .40),  or the AQ in the ASD group 
(r < .40). The Intention Mental State Language score of the SSFt correlated negatively 
with the ADI-R communication domain (higher scores on the ADI-R indicate higher 
levels of ASD symptoms) although it did not reach the .01 significance level set here 
(r = - .47, p = .050). 
 
For the control group, the AQ and the SSFt Intention Accuracy score revealed a 
substantial negative correlation although the .01 significance level was not met (r  = -
.50, p  = .025), while the Intention Mental State Language score showed a significant 
negative association with the AQ (r = -.59, p = .006). 
 
For the ASD group, partial correlation analysis (controlling for verbal ability) 
revealed no association between the SSFt Intention Accuracy scores and the IRI PT 
domain (r >.40). However, the Interaction question and the EC domain of the IRI 
showed a substantial partial correlation, but it did not meet the .01 significance level 
set here (r = .44 p = .067).  
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For the Control group the Accuracy score on the SSFt showed a substantial 
correlation with the PT subscale of the IRI, but it did not meet the .01 significance set 
here (r = .48, p  = .032). Partial correlation (controlling for verbal ability) revealed no 
association between the IRI EC and the Interaction question of the SSFt  (rs < .40). 
 
No significant associations were found in either group between alexithymia traits 
and performance on the SSFt (all r < .40).  
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Discussion 
Overall, the SSFt was shown to be effective at discriminating between adults with 
and without a diagnosis of autism. Adults with ASD had lower scores, indicating 
difficulties with social cognition that could not be explained by general cognitive factors 
(e.g. verbal ability) and were specific to understanding the intentions behind nonliteral 
language in communication. The SSFt was superior to existing, well-evidenced 
measures of social cognition/emotion recognition in its ability to discriminate ASD from 
matched controls. The finding that the control group’s performance was not 
undermined by ceiling effects (alongside the borderline significant association with 
questionnaire measures of autistic traits/empathy) suggests that the SSFt may also be 
useful for measuring individual differences in social cognitive ability in the general 
population. The development of a forced- choice paradigm that could be used online 
would facilitate this research and increase its scope for reaching more diverse samples 
(age, geographical location etc).  
Perspective taking on the IRI and ASD traits (measured by the AQ) substantially 
correlated with the SSFt only in the control group. This might reflect differences in self-
reflection in the ASD versus control group although this cannot be answered from this 
research. Future research including informant rated measures of perspective taking 
(Demurie, De Corel, & Roeyers, 2011) would help fill this gap in the literature. Informant 
based (retrospective) childhood ASD symptoms did not significantly correlate with 
performance on the SSFt again pointing to the benefits of current informant-rated 
autistic traits in future research. Also childhood ASD symptoms may not be a helpful 
correlate of adult social cognitive abilities due to the developmental nature of social 
cognition (Happé & Frith, 2013) 
While the Intention question of the SSFt was effective in differentiating the two 
groups and replicated social cognitive differences observed in previous research using 
advanced theory of mind tasks, the Interaction question (the novel element) of this 
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social cognition paradigm yielded higher levels of sensitivity without compromising 
specificity. The ability to infer what others may be thinking may be necessary but not 
sufficient for generation of neurotypical social interaction in individuals with ASD. This 
notion fits Yang and Baillargeon's (2013) suggestion that it is the lack of ‘social acting’ 
that is most relevant to peer relation difficulties seen in adults with ASD traits. ASD 
participants who may comprehend why an individual is using figurative language in the 
SSFt (e.g. not to hurt the other’s feelings), may still have a different appraisal of its 
usefulness and hence generate different possible subsequent responses (e.g. why did 
you say it’s good when you clearly don’t think that?). The Interaction question also 
involves generativity, which is among the executive functions suggested to be impaired 
in ASD (Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh, & Thoma, 2013; Hill, 2004).  In future 
research with the SSFt, it would be useful to include measures of executive function 
to examine the role of (non-social) generativity in performance (Dziobek et al., 2006). 
Alexithymia has received considerable interest as an independent but frequently 
co-occurring condition reported by those with ASD. Bird & Cook (2013) report evidence 
that it is alexithymia that explains emotion-recognition difficulties in individuals rather 
than autism per se. In the current sample, alexithymia was elevated in the ASD group, 
but there was no significant relationship between alexithymia and performance on the 
SSFt. The SSFt focuses primarily on recognition of propositional mental states (e.g. 
beliefs, intentions) rather than emotion processing, which may explain the lack of 
association (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013). In line with this, Brewer et al. 
(2015) argue that such a fractionation of abilities is evidence that social cognition may 
depend not on a single or unified system but on distinct, albeit inter-dependant, 
cognitive processes. 
This study was not without its limitations. The exploratory nature of the study, 
focused on the design and inclusion of a completely novel task, meant that many 
variables were included.  To minimise the number of statistical comparisons, and 
hence likelihood of type 1 error, we tested a priori predictions for most variables, but 
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used 2-tailed probabilities to be conservative. A larger sample size would be desirable 
in future work; we may have lacked power to find smaller effects and some substantial 
correlations did not reach significance. Missing data is likely to have affected findings 
in such a small sample. The SSFt itself was limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
relatively low inter-item reliability suggests that the measure may not assess a single 
underlying construct (Devine & Hughes, 2013). However, the test was designed to 
have items with varying levels of difficulty (e.g. first and second order ToM), and this 
is likely to have added to the somewhat low rates of internal consistency. Minimal 
variance in the memory questions (in particular the control clips) resulted in an 
observed difference between the groups and this impacted their utility.. Finally, the 
theory of mind impairments demonstrated here on our novel task may not be specific 
to ASD; a wealth of literature exists evidencing individual differences in theory of mind 
as central to various clinical presentations (e.g. Schizophrenia; Chung et al., 2013; 
Pinkham et al., 2013; Sparks, McDonald, Lino, O'Donnelle, & Green, 2010). Further 
studies should include the use of alternative clinical samples to explore the use of the 
SSFt as a viable measure of social cognition across clinical presentations. 
Further examination of participants’ ‘propensity vs. ability’ (Vivanti, 2015) when 
answering the SSFt would also be of interest in future research. The current study was 
not designed to distinguish these two aspects of task performance. The use of more 
open-ended questions may go some way in delineating participants’ internal drives to 
engage in the task and their social cognitive ability. Moreover, eye tracking studies, 
which have revealed differences in those with ASD in both implicit drives to engage in 
social stimuli (e.g. attending to actors faces vs. objects on screen (Klin et al. 2003) and 
in cases where explicit question scores are comparable to controls (Senju, Southgate, 
White, & Frith, 2009), could also shed light on the ‘propensity vs. ability’ distinction 
(Vivanti, 2015).  
The development of the measure may also be conceptually limited by the 
‘methodology of consensus’ (Johnston, Miles, & McKinlay, 2008). This criticism applies 
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to all social cognition measures using actors (see Table 1) and agreement between 
(neurotypical) raters to score responses, and so is not unique to the current research. 
However, it questions the objectivity of the measure and calls into question the pursuit 
of objectivity in this line of research (see Johnston, et al., (2008) for an insightful yet 
critical appraisal). Leading from this Milton (2012) argues that the ToM hypothesis of 
social cognition places the social deficit within the individual, which misrepresents the 
relational context within which social exchanges occur. He uses the term ‘double 
empathy problem’ to highlight that ‘the social difficulty’ is bi-directional in so much as 
it resides in both the ASD individual and those without the diagnosis. Such theoretical 
critiques raise interesting considerations, with regard to the nature of and direction of 
future research in the field of social cognition where the focus is not restricted to the 
observer’s ‘abilities’ but expressivity of the agents (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008) and 
relationships between individuals. What appears to be relatively uncontentious is that 
novel ways of presenting interaction between agents, examining contextual effects, 
and the using of tools that reflect real life interactions are important in assessing social 
cognition (Dziobek, 2012); this piece of research is a small step in that direction.  
The current study developed a novel, dynamic, video-based measure to assess 
social cognitive abilities. This study provides clinicians and researchers with a sensitive 
tool to assess attribution of mental states relevant to everyday communication and 
interaction. 
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Appendix: White lie example clip: 
Third person perspective of Max and Alice sitting in the living room across from 
each other and Alice holding a guitar about to play: 
 
 
Focus on Alice from Max’s perspective: (looking nervous) ‘I’ve been working on 
this for ages and I think I have finally got it. I think my songs gonna end like this…. 
(strums badly played chord then sings out of tune) ooo ooo ooo yeah’ (looks expectant 
at camera) 
 
 
Focus on Max from Alice’s perspective: (nods head encouragingly and half smiles)  
 
‘Well done Alice… that sounds really good’  
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Table 1: Characteristics of current dynamic social cognition task 
Table 1: *Age, gender and IQ matched AMT: Awkward Moments Test, RMFT: Reading the Mind in the Films Task, MASC: A Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition, FC: Forced choice, ER: Emotion Recognition. 
Author Test Stimuli Question type Participants Relevant findings Strengths Limitations 
Heavey 
et al., 
(2000) 
AMT UK  
advertisement
s (7) and TV 
series clip (1). 
FC ER  
 
FC memory 
 
Open-ended  
interview 
regarding 
intentions of 
characters.  
 
 
Adults: 
16 ASD 
15 Controls* 
ASD <Controls, including some 
Memory questions. 
 
Intention questions yielded greater 
effects than FC ER questions.  
 
Only controls performance on AMT 
related to the SS and IQ.  
 
No group response latency difference  
Open ended questions. 
 
Convergent validity 
 
ASD group struggled with 
memory questions. 
 
Complex coding system 
for intentionality. 
 
45-120 second long clips. 
 
Overacted/dramatic 
stimuli. 
 
No control clips. 
Golan et 
al., 
(2006) 
RMFT 22 short film 
clips from 
feature films.  
FC ER Adults: 
22 ASD 
22 Controls* 
ASD < Controls 
 
Performance on RMFT related to VIQ, 
AQ and CMFVB 
Replicated with child version 
 
Complex emotions. 
 
Convergent Validity 
No control 
clips/questions. 
 
Consensus decided 
emotions. 
Dziobek 
et al., 
(2006) 
MASC 15min video of 
4 characters 
preparing for a 
party. Film 
stopped for 
each 
question(46 
times). 
Open ended 
concerning 
characters’ 
thoughts, 
feelings and 
intentions. 
 
Memory. 
Adults: 
19 ASD 
20 Controls* 
MASC group difference > Eyes, SS 
and ER task. 
 
ASD=Controls on Memory Questions. 
 
No association with MASC and VIQ 
 
MASC associated with SS and ADI-R 
 
No association between Eyes, ER or 
SS tasks.  
Open questions 
 
Tailored stimuli 
 
Range of linguistic concepts 
 
Convergent validity 
 
Re-test reliability 
 
Replicated with FC version.  
 
45min administration 
time. 
 
Non-English speaking. 
 
Trained rater required for 
scoring 
 
Basic control questions. 
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Table 1 cont: Characteristics of current dynamic social cognition tasks. 
Author Test Stimuli Scoring/ 
Question type 
Participants Relevant findings Strengths Limitations 
Barnes et 
al., (2009) 
MDFT 4 film clips 
from 
American TV 
show 
‘House’. 
Use of mental 
state words in 
narrative 
description of 
task, length of 
description, type 
of mental states 
used. 
Adults: 
28 ASD 
28 Controls* 
Lower frequency of mental state 
references in ASD narratives and shorter 
overall. 
 
VIQ correlated with performance only for 
ASD. 
 
Empathy scores correlated with only 
controls’ performance on MDFT. 
Open questions. 
 
Convergent validity. 
No intention questions. 
 
Dramatised stimuli. 
Mathersul 
et al., 
(2013) 
TASIT: 
part 2 
and 3. 
31 self-
contained 
clips of 
ambiguous 
social 
interchanges
. 
FC regarding 
thoughts, 
feelings (ER) 
and intentions of 
characters. 
Adults: 
40 ASD 
37 Controls* 
ASD < Controls, but not on ER questions. 
 
VIQ did not correlate with performance 
on TASIT. 
 
Only self-reported cognitive empathy 
predicted by TASIT independent of 
group. 
Large sample. 
 
Convergent validity 
 
Bespoke clips  
No control clips or 
questions. 
 
Lengthy administration 
(60-75mins). 
 
 
Table 1. *Age, gender and IQ matched, MDFT: Moral Dilemmas Film Task , TASIT: The Awareness of Social Inference Test, FC: Forced choice, ER: Emotion 
Recognition 
 
 
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Participant characteristics: Mean (SD) 
 ASD 
N=20 
Control 
N=20 
t df p-value d 95% mean  
Difference CI 
. 
Age in years  30.60 (6.52) 30.65 (6.27) .02538 .980 0.01 -3.82 - 4.00a 
 
Gender (F:M) 0:20 1:19  1.00c - - 
 
VIQ  105.05 (17.01) 111.25 (11.52) 1.3533.4 .186 0.42 -2.89 - 14.90a 
 
AQ  34.21 (7.42)b 15.55 (7.21) -7.9637 .000 -2.55 -23.41 - -13.91  
Table 2 : abootstrap derived confidence intervals  bASD N=19  c Fisher’s Exact test AQ= Autism 
Quotient  
 
 
 
Table 3: Results by group for traditional tests of social cognition: Mean (SD) 
 ASD 
N=20 
Controls 
N=20 
tdf p-value d 95% 
CI 
Strange Stories       
Accuracy (max=16) 
Mental State Language 
(max=16) 
11.60 (2.39) 
 
11.85 (1.87) 
13.35 (1.73) 
 
12.50 (1.67) 
2.6538 
 
1.1638 
 
 
.012 
 
.254 
.84 
 
.37 
.51 – 3.01a 
 
-.42 - 1.74a 
RMET       
Accuracy (max = 36) 25.00 (4.08) 27.68 (4.27)b 2.0137 .052       .64 .06 - 5.29 a 
Triangles        
Accuracy (max=8) 
Mental State Language 
(max=8) 
 
3.70 (2.20) 
 
1.90 (1.41) 
5.20 (2.21) 
 
3.55 (1.90) 
2.1538 
 
3.1138 
.038 
 
.004 
.68 
 
.98 
.09 - 2.91 
 
.58 – 2.65 a 
TASIT Part 1       
Accuracy (max = 28) 23.75 (2.36) 24.75 (1.92) 1.4738 .149 .47 -.27 - 2.33a 
Table 3. abootstrap derived confidence intervals. b N=19. 
 
 
 
  
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
 
 
Table 4: Results by group for IRI and TAS-20: Mean (SD) 
 ASD 
N=19 
Controls 
N=20 
t df p-value d 95% 
CI 
 
IRI subscales [max=28] 
      
 
Perspective Taking   
 
13.21 (6.07) 
 
17.75 (4.79) 
 
2.6037 
 
.013 
 
0.83 
 
1.00 - 8.08 
Fantasising    13.05 (5.58) 15.90 (4.72) 1.7237 .093 0.55 -.50 -6.20  
Empathic Concern   17.42 (4.10) 17.75 (2.59) 0.3037 .765 0.10 -1.80 - 2.51a 
Personal Distress   14.42 (5.71) 10.25 (4.28) -2.5937 .014 -0.83 -7.43 - -.91 
 
TAS-20: 
      
 
Identify Emotions 
[max=35]  
 
20.58 (5.98) 
 
15.60 (6.02) 
 
-2.5937 
 
.014 
 
-0.83 
 
-8.88 - -1.08 
Describe Emotions 
[max=25]  
 
17.95 (3.46) 
 
12.95 (5.27) 
 
-3.5233 
 
.001 
 
-1.13 
 
-7.71 - -2.18a 
Externally Orientated 
Thinking [max=40] 
 
23.05 (4.48) 
 
18.05 (4.44) 
 
-3.5037 
 
.001 
 
-1.12 
 
-7.90 - -2.10 
 
Total [max=100]  
 
61.58 (10.07) 
 
46.60 (11.10) 
 
-4.4137 
 
.000 
 
-1.41 
 
-21.87 - -8.09 
Table 4: abootstrap derived confidence intervals 
 
 
Table 5: Results by group for The Strange Stories Film task : M (SD) 
The Strange Stories Film 
task  
ASD 
N=20 
Controls 
N=20 
tdf Fdf p-
value 
d 95% 
CI 
        
Experimental Clips         
        
Accuracy (max=24) 15.50 (3.55) 18.80 (2.33)  9.5537 .004 1.00 .96 – 4.62 
Mental State Language 
(max=24) 
 
12.15 (2.56) 
 
13.75 (2.45) 
  
2.4337 
 
.128 
 
.56 
 
-.35 – 2.70 
Interaction (max=24) 10.95 (3.46) 16.95 (4.14)  22.0637 .000 1.52 3.01 - 7.59 
Memory (max=12) 11.55 (0.69) 11.85 (0.37)  
 
2.3237 .137 .49 -.08 - .66 a 
        
Control Clips         
        
Accuracy (max=6) 4.05 (1.39) 4.40 (0.99)  .1637 .690 .13 -.52. - .83a 
Mental State Language 
(max=6) 
 
0.90 (0.85) 
 
1.25 (1.16) 
 
 
 
.6836 
 
.415 
 
.27 
 
-.46 - .89a 
Interaction (max=6) 5.50 (0.89) 5.70 (0.65) 0.8138  .423 .26 -.29 – .70a 
Memory (max = 3)  2.95 (0.22) 3.00 (0.00) 1.4519  .163 .46 .04 – .26a 
Table 5. abootstrap derived confidence intervals. 
 
 
  
The ‘Strange Stories Film Task’. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
